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Junk Science, Test Validity, and the 
Uniform Guidelines for Personnel 
Selection Procedures: The Case 
of Melendez v. Illinois Bell 
Fred B. Bryant, Ph.D. and Elaine K.B. Siegel 
Loyola University Chicago  Hager & Siegel, P.C. 
This paper stems from a recent federal court case in which a stand-
ardized test of cognitive ability developed by AT&T, the Basic 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT), was ruled invalid and discrimi-
natory for use in hiring Latinos.  Within the context of the BSAT, 
we discuss spurious statistical arguments advanced by the defense, 
exploiting certain language in the current Uniform Guidelines for 
evaluating the fairness and validity of personnel selection tests.  
These issues include: (a) how to avoid capitalizing on chance; (b) 
what constitutes “a measure” of job performance; (c) how to judge 
the meaningfulness of group differences in performance measures; 
and (d) how to combine data from different sex, race, or ethnic 
subgroups when computing validity coefficients for the pooled, 
total sample.  Pursuant to the Uniform Guidelines’ standard for un-
fairness, when one ethnic group scores higher on an employment 
test, the test is deemed “unfair” if this difference is not reflected in 
a measure of job performance.  Although studies validating selec-
tion instruments often survive the unfairness test, such data are 
vulnerable to bias and manipulation, if appropriate statistical pro-
cedures are not used.  We consider both the benefits (greater clarity 
and precision) and the potential costs (loss of legal precedent) of 
revising the Uniform Guidelines to address these issues.  We fur-
ther discuss legal procedures to limit “junk science” in the court-
room, and the need to reevaluate validity generalization in light of 
Simpson’s “false correlation” paradox. 
The purpose of this paper is to share our 
insights from a recent federal court case, which 
we refer to as Melendez, involving a claim of 
employment discrimination in personnel selec-
tion, Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Com-
pany, No. 90 C 5020 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1994), 
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aff’d, 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996).
1
  These in-
sights arise from certain defenses advanced by 
the employer, in which dubious statistical proce-
dures were justified by language from current 
federal guidelines for validating personnel se-
lection tests, the Uniform Guidelines for Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, promulgated joint-
ly by the United States Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and the United States De-
partments of Labor, Justice, and the Treasury 
[43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (August 25, 1978); EEOC, 
29 CFR Part 1607].  We refer to these as the 
Uniform Guidelines. 
 After providing some background to the 
particular legal case involved, we describe the 
original validation studies that formed the heart 
of the litigation, and present research evidence 
which was the main point of contention at trial.  
After summarizing the evidence against the vali-
dity of the personnel selection test in question—
the Basic Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT)—we 
highlight some apparent ambiguities in the Uni-
form Guidelines.  Comparable ambiguities exist 
in both the Standards for Educational and Psy-
chological Testing
2 
and in the Society for Indus-
trial and Organizational Psychology’s
 
Principles 
for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selec-
tion Procedures.
3
  Ironically, although the Uni-
form Guidelines are intended to promote equal-
ity of employment opportunity regardless of 
race, religion, and gender, they do not expressly 
prohibit the use of certain research practices that 
produce spurious artifacts, and which actually 
perpetuate discrimination in the workplace. 
 In this paper we share our observations 
with professionals within the psychological 
testing, statistical analysis, human resources and 
legal communities; discuss the application of 
Uniform Guidelines in maintaining consistency 
vis-à-vis professional standards; and conclude 
by recommending a reevaluation of the proce-
dure of validity generalization in light of Simp-
son’s “false correlation” paradox (i.e., paradox-
ical confounding). 
Historical Context 
 What was this trial all about?  Plaintiff 
Carmelo Melendez claimed he was denied equal 
employment opportunity in applying for a job 
with defendant Illinois Bell Telephone Com-
pany.  Mr. Melendez was born and raised in 
Puerto Rico, and moved to East Chicago in the 
middle of his grade school years.  Though he 
spoke no English, Mr. Melendez was placed in a 
monolingual English classroom.  A straight-A 
student in Puerto Rico, in the United States he 
got F’s.  By struggling hard, he learned English, 
taught himself the skills he needed to advance, 
and raised his grades until, by the time he gradu-
ated from high school, he was earning B’s. 
 It was then, however, that Mr. Melendez 
first encountered an obstacle that he could not 
overcome, and that he would confront through-
out his adult life: standardized ability tests.  He 
performed miserably on the SAT, and could not 
attend college.  He decided to apply for an 
entry-level position in metallurgy at the local 
steel mill.  He failed the standardized entry 
examination, however.  Yet another standardi-
zed test kept him out of the military. 
 Mr. Melendez persevered, and eventu-
ally got his college degree.  He also became a 
certified x-ray technician, and he eventually 
worked for the federal Civil Rights Commis-
sion.  He went on to become the host of a Chica-
go-area television talkshow.  Then, in 1988, he 
applied for a job as Assistant Manager of Urban 
Affairs for Illinois Bell. 
 The job description called for a person 
who could interface with the local Latino com-
munity, to assess emerging urban trends for use 
in marketing telecommunications services.  The 
successful applicant should be able to interact 
with community leaders and residents, and to 
communicate effectively in a bilingual setting, 
orally and in writing. 
 Illinois Bell required all external appli-
cants for its first-level management jobs to sur-
mount three separate pass-fail hurdles.  Appli-
cants had to have a college diploma, graduating 
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in the top half of the class.  Applicants had to 
pass a structured, standardized interview, dem-
onstrating a sufficient level of leadership.  Fin-
ally, applicants had to take the standardized 
Basic Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT), scoring 
at or above a raw pass-fail cutoff score of 196.  
This cognitive ability test was the central focus 
of the court case. 
 The BSAT is a standardized paper-and-
pencil test, purporting to assess verbal and quan-
titative ability, much like the SAT.  It also incl-
udes questions designed to tap the ability to fol-
low directions, in which one must indicate an-
swers while listening to a tape-recording which 
contains complex, conflicting instructions. Each 
subsection of the test is timed, or “speeded,” and 
the entire test takes about one hour. 
 Despite his college degree and his suc-
cess on the leadership interview, Mr. Melendez 
failed the BSAT.  He grew depressed and des-
pondent, and became estranged from his family 
for more than a year.  Not long after his reject-
tion by Illinois Bell, however, Melendez won a 
position with the federal government.  He has 
performed successfully there ever since, and has 
risen to a position of authority. 
 Based on his experience, Mr. Melendez 
believed that the BSAT was unfair because it 
was not job-related.  He saw no connection be-
tween the skills required to do well on the job of 
Assistant Urban Affairs Manager, and the skills 
required to pass the BSAT.  To right the wrong, 
he filed suit against Illinois Bell for employment 
discrimination. 
Adverse Impact of the BSAT 
 Before turning to the evidence concern-
ing test validity, we first consider the BSAT’s 
impact on applicants of different ethnicity (i.e., 
the BSAT pass-fail rates for different racial or 
ethnic groups).  Table 1 presents pass-fail rates 
for whites, African-Americans and Latinos on 
the BSAT separately for two time periods: 1979 
and 1987-88.  The 1979 statistics are for 591 
managerial applicants, and are taken directly 
from the original AT&T validation report: in 
1979, about 3 in 4 whites passed the test, versus 
1 in 5 African-Americans, and 1 in 2 Latinos.
4 
 
Table 1: Rates of Success and Failure on the 
BSAT for Different Racial Groups 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       Racial Group   
                          White          Black         Latino 
                        ------------   ------------   ----------- 
Time Period       P      F       P       F        P       F 
----------------   -----  -----   -----   -----   -----  ----- 
1979         n     265    79 42    151      25     29 
                 %      77    23 22      78      47     53 
1987-88    n     344    51 83      62      50     44 
                 %      87    13     57      43      53     47 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Between-Group Pairwise Comparisons 
                   via Fisher’s Exact Test 
             W79       W87       B79       B87       L79 
W87   .000459 
B79    .000001      .000001 
B87    .000018      .000001    .000001 
L79    .000010      .000001    .000827       .21 
L87    .000014      .000001    .000001       .60           .50 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Pairwise comparisons were performed using two-
tailed Fisher’s exact test computed using ODA software.
5
  
Row and column headings indicate both ethnic class (W= 
white, B=Black, L=Latino) and time period (79=1979, 
87=1987-88).  Tabled for each unique combination of row 
and column is the p-value (six significant digits) for the 
exact test comparing pass/fail rates of the corresponding 
samples.  P-values indicated in red are statistically signifi-
cant at experimentwise p<0.05 based on an appropriate 
Bonferroni criterion (see discussion in paper: p<.05/1115, 
or p<0.000046); p-values indicated in blue are statistically 
significant at the generalized criterion (per-comparison p< 
0.05); p-values indicated in black are not significant.
5
 
 
 The 1987-88 pass-fail statistics are from 
Illinois Bell’s records, from a sample of 634 
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applicants for first-level management positions.  
During the 1987-88 period, most whites—nearly 
9 in 10—passed the test, versus 6 in 10 African-
Americans and 5 in 10 Latinos. 
 To evaluate these pass-fail rates, there is 
a guideline for judging the impact of an employ-
ment test on different ethnic groups.  This rule-
of-thumb is known as the “four-fifths rule.”  
According to this guideline, a test has an adver-
se impact on an ethnic group whose pass rate is 
less than four-fifths the rate of the group with 
the highest test pass-rate: “A selection rate for 
any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than 
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate 
for the group with the highest rate will generally 
be regarded by the Federal enforcement agen-
cies as evidence of adverse impact, while a 
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be 
regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact” (Uniform Guide-
lines, §1607.4.D).  The Uniform Guidelines de-
fine “adverse impact” as: “A substantially dif-
ferent rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or 
other employment decision which works to the 
disadvantage of members of a race, sex, or eth-
nic group” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.16.B). 
 In 1979, for example, whites had the 
highest pass-rate on the BSAT, at 77% (see 
Table 1).  The BSAT, then, had an adverse im-
pact on any group in 1979 whose BSAT pass-
rate falls below four-fifths of 77% (or below 
61.6%).  The 1979 pass-rates for African-Amer-
icans (22%) and Latinos (47%) are clearly lower 
than the four-fifths mark of 61.6%. 
 For the 1987-88 period, under the Uni-
form Guidelines’ four-fifths rule, the BSAT had 
an adverse impact on any group whose pass-rate 
falls below four-fifths of the white pass rate of 
87% (or below 69.6%).  Because pass rates for 
African-Americans (57%) and Latinos (53%) 
are below this four-fifths mark of 69.6%, the 
BSAT had an adverse impact on both of these 
groups during 1987-88, according to the Uni-
form Guidelines’ standard. 
 This evidence of strong and consistent 
adverse impact makes test validity even more 
vital.  Rejecting such a large number of minority 
applicants might be defensible, if the test accu-
rately predicted important on-the-job perform-
ance.  For example, imagine using a valid test of 
visual acuity to select fighter-pilots; if minority 
applicants have worse eyesight than majority 
applicants, then so be it.  It is an entirely differ-
ent matter, however, if the test has nothing to do 
with on-the-job performance.  If minorities do 
not actually have worse eyesight, then the test 
unfairly denies them equal employment oppor-
tunity.  In the case of the BSAT, the evidence 
for test validity is particularly critical, given the 
unequivocal adverse impact on minorities.  In 
the words of the Uniform Guidelines: “Reliance 
upon a selection procedure which is signifi-
cantly related to a criterion measure, but which 
is based upon a study involving a large number 
of subjects and has a low correlation coefficient 
will be subject to close review if it has a large 
adverse impact...” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607. 
14(B)(6). 
BSAT Validation Studies 
 Two validation studies of the BSAT 
formed the heart of the litigation, and the trial 
gravitated around certain research evidence 
from these studies.  In the late 1970s, AT&T in-
dustrial/organizational psychologists developed 
the BSAT, using test components originally 
written by the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS), which also developed the SAT, LSAT, 
GRE, and other cognitive ability tests.  One of 
the AT&T psychologists drafted the final re-
search report containing two validation studies, 
which assessed the relationship between BSAT 
scores and job performance.  These studies pur-
ported to evaluate the BSAT’s predictive vali-
dity, i.e., its ability to predict subsequent on-the-
job performance.  Illinois Bell relied on these 
validation studies in using the BSAT to screen 
its job applicants.   
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 The first of the two validation studies, 
referred to as the Preliminary Study, focused on 
entry-level managers already hired at 8 different 
company locations throughout the country.  This 
Preliminary Study included 229 managers who 
had earlier taken a large battery of standardized 
tests, including the School and College Ability 
Test (SCAT) and the predecessor of the BSAT, 
the Bell System Qualification Test (BSQT).  
One year after these applicants were hired their 
job performance was evaluated by their super-
visors, who rated each applicant’s job perform-
ance using a set of 13 criterion measures, 
developed through a job analysis of manage-
ment positions, including ratings of skills in 
planning, decision making, oral and written co-
mmunications, leadership, resistance to stress, 
interpersonal awareness, and a global rating of 
overall job performance.  The test developers 
then selected a subset of verbal and math items 
based on correlations with supervisor ratings, 
and these items became the BSAT.  Researchers 
then examined the relationship between test 
score and rating of overall job performance to 
establish a pass-fail cut-score for the test, which 
was implemented throughout AT&T companies. 
 The second validation study, referred to 
as the Followup Study, focused on 286 job app-
licants who were applying for entry-level man-
agement positions in 11 different AT&T com-
pany locations.  Applicants selected for partici-
pation were given the BSAT (using the pass-fail 
cut-score determined in the Preliminary Study), 
and then one year later, their supervisors were 
asked to rate each employee on a set of 15 per-
formance criteria.  As in the Preliminary Study, 
researchers examined the correlation between 
test scores and performance ratings, trying to 
cross-validate the findings from the Preliminary 
Study. Thus, both validation studies concern the 
predictive validity of the test, that is, whether 
the test accurately predicts job performance and 
is therefore job-related. 
 
Validity Evidence for the BSAT 
 What evidence is there concerning the 
predictive validity of the BSAT?  The primary 
validity evidence in the validation studies con-
sists of Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients relating applicants’ test scores to 
supervisors’ performance ratings. 
 Preliminary Study.  Turning first to 
Table 2, note that the Preliminary Study reports 
no figures for Latinos.  Instead, for African-
Americans and whites separately and for the 
pooled data set, it reports correlations between 
BSAT scores and each of the 13 performance 
ratings.  Note that the BSAT shows a statis-
tically significant correlation with ratings of 
overall job performance for the total sample, 
r(151)=0.38, p<0.00001.  For whites, however, 
only 4 of the 13 criterion measures show a sta-
tistically significant (p<0.05) relationship with 
BSAT score.  Indeed, BSAT scores had no sig-
nificant relationship with ratings of overall job 
performance for whites.  Averaging across all 
correlations for whites (mean r=0.128, p<0.08), 
the BSAT predicts about 2% of the variance in 
whites’ performance ratings.  This represents a 
Hedges corrected effect-size of 0.26, equivalent 
to an experimental effect in which the treatment 
group scores about one-quarter of a standard de-
viation above the control group. 
 Also note that, for African-Americans, 7 
of the 13 performance ratings (including overall 
job performance) show a statistically significant 
relationship with BSAT score.  Averaging 
across all correlations (mean r=0.314, p<0.006), 
the BSAT explains about 10% of the variance in 
African-Americans’ performance ratings (Hed-
ges corrected g=0.65).  Considered together, this 
evidence from the Preliminary Study suggests 
that the BSAT is largely invalid for use with 
whites, but has marginal validity for use with 
African-Americans.  We return later to the first 
column of Table 2, giving validity coefficients 
for the total group. 
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Table 2: Preliminary Study Correlations 
Between BSAT Score and Job Performance 
Ratings for Different Groups 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
                 Groups 
   Total       White     Black 
        Job Skills            n=153       n=94      n=39 
------------------------- --------    --------    --------- 
Organizing and 
Planning   .28
*
      .09         .34
*
 
Decision Making  .30
*
      .20
*
         .27
 
 
Decisiveness   .39
*
      .25
*
         .36
*
 
Oral Communi- 
cations               .23
*    
      .08         .43
*
 
Written Communi- 
cations               .28
*
      .21
*
         .26 
Leadership   .36
*
      .02          .54
*
 
Interpersonal 
Awareness   .25
*
      .09         .30
*
 
Behavior 
Flexibility              .20
*
      .04         .20 
Fact Finding   .38
*
      .29
*
         .24 
Resistance 
to Stress              .21
*
      .11         .18 
Energy    .15      .04          .08 
Management 
Potential   .42
*
      .11         .42
*
 
Overall Job 
Performance   .38
*
      .13         .46
*
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Adapted from Tables 4 and 8 of the original valida-
tion report.
4
  An asterisk (*) indicates p<0.05 at the gener-
alized (per-comparison) criterion.
5
  N for the total sample 
is greater than the sum of the ns for the white and black 
groups because the Preliminary Study included 16 His-
panics and 4 “other minorities” whose data were pooled 
in the analysis of the total sample.  Discussed further 
ahead in the paper, the “false correlation paradox” (para-
doxical confounding) is present when an index for pooled 
samples lies outside the range of index values for indivi-
dual samples considered separately (indicated in red). 
 Followup Study.  Table 3 gives validity 
coefficients for the Followup Study.  Again the 
BSAT shows a significant correlation with rat-
ings of overall job performance for total sample, 
r(284)=0.21, p<0.001.   For whites, 4 of 15 per-
formance ratings show a significant relationship 
with BSAT score: averaging coefficients (mean 
r=0.077, p>0.19), the BSAT predicts about 2% 
of the variance in whites’ performance ratings 
(corrected g=0.19).  For African-Americans, 8 
of 15 validity coefficients are significant: aver-
aging coefficients (mean r=0.215, p<0.01), the 
BSAT predicts about 6% of the variance in Afri-
can-Americans’ performance ratings (corrected 
g=0.44).  BSAT score was significantly related 
to ratings of overall job performance for both 
whites and African-Americans, though these 
effect sizes again were relatively small. 
 The fourth column in Table 3 reports the 
only direct empirical evidence available con-
cerning the validity of the BSAT for use in 
hiring Latinos.  Only one of the 15 validity coef-
ficients was significantly different from zero for 
Latinos (r=0.24, p<0.05, one-tailed) for Latinos.  
The sole significant coefficient (for coordina-
tion) was reported as nonsignificant in the orig-
inal validation study.  Essentially, this means 
that the BSAT does no better than chance in 
predicting how Latinos will perform on the job 
(mean r=0.093, p>0.32, corrected g=0.21). 
 In relation to the present case, this is the 
single most relevant piece of validity evidence 
in the entire report.  Plainly, these data do not 
support the validity of using the BSAT to hire 
Latinos. 
Inflation of Apparent Validity Vis-à-Vis 
Extensive Analysis: The “Trolling” Problem 
 It would be one matter if the coefficients 
were the only analyses in the validation studies.  
If this were the case, then there would be 49 
tests of statistical hypotheses in the Preliminary 
Study (Table 3) and 60 tests in the Followup 
Study (Table 4), for a total of 109 tests. 
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Table 3: Followup Study Correlations Between BSAT Score 
and Job Performance Ratings for Different Groups 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                                                        Groups   
                    Total        White             Black                Latino 
               Job Skills                (n=286)               (n=147)            (n=76)                (n=57) 
------------------------------------              ----------               ----------               ---------                --------- 
Organizing and Planning      0.17
*
         0.08      0.19       0.15 
Decision Making       0.18
*
        -0.12    0.21
*
      -0.08 
Oral Communications                  0.17
*
         0.10    0.26
*
       0.01 
Written Communications      0.28
*
         0.18
*
    0.44
*
       0.10 
General Administration      0.11
*
         0.09    0.22
*
       0.07 
Supervision        0.01          0.02    0.10       0.09 
Coordination                   0.19
*
         0.01    0.30
*
       0.24
*
 
Behavior Flexibility                  0.10
*
         0.03    0.20       0.08 
Fact Finding                   0.25
*
         0.10    0.33
*
       0.18 
Problem Solving       0.22
*
         0.17
*
    0.25
*
       0.08 
Resistance to Stress         0.05          0.06    0.05       0.05 
Ability to Learn and Develop        0.16
*
         0.05    0.17       0.10 
Tolerance of Ambiguity      0.12
*
         0.08    0.17       0.07 
Management Potential      0.16
*
         0.16
*
    0.08       0.12 
Overall Job Performance      0.21
*
         0.14
*
    0.26
*
       0.14 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Adapted from Table 18 of the original validation report .
4
  N for the total sample is greater than the sum of the ns for 
the three subgroups because the Followup Study included six Asians whose data were pooled for total sample analysis.  An 
asterisk (*) indicates p<0.05 at the generalized (per-comparison) criterion.  The coefficient indicated in red was reported as 
being nonsignificant in the original validation report, but is actually statistically significant at the generalized criterion 
(p<0.05, one-tailed). 
 
 Tallying across the entire validation 
report, however, reveals that more than a thou-
sand statistical tests were performed—all using 
the p<0.05 level of statistical significance.  Of 
those 1000 tests, 50 would be expected simply 
by chance alone to be statistically significant at 
per-comparison p< 0.05, although exactly which 
effects are attributable to chance cannot be 
known.  The validity evidence is thus inflated, 
as the excessive statistical testing adds a sub-
stantial number of chance correlations to the 
true correlations.  Accordingly, well-known pro-
cedures for controlling the experimentwise Type  
 
 
 
I error-rate should be used.
5
  For example, 
among the most commonly employed methods 
for reducing the number of “false-positive” 
results when conducting numerous statistical 
tests is the so-called “Bonferroni adjustment, in 
which an adjusted p-value is obtained by divid-
ing the desired alpha-level by the number of p-
values examined.  For the BSAT validation 
report, a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value would be 
roughly .05/1100, or p<0.00005.  This is the 
cost for undertaking vast numbers of analyses 
indiscriminately, when analyses can and should 
be more clearly focused.
5,6 
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Table 4: Followup Study Means and Standard Deviations for the 15 Job Performance Ratings, 
and for BSAT Score for Whites (n=147) and Latinos (n=57) 
                                                   Whites         Latinos 
                                                   ---------------          --------------- 
               Job Skills     Mean     sd          Mean      sd 
------------------------------------    -------   ------         -------   ------ 
Organizing and Planning     5.22     1.13          4.99      1.04 
Decision Making      5.15     0.93          4.93      0.84 
Oral Communications      5.31     1.15          4.88      1.18 
Written Communications     5.24     1.16          4.82      1.23 
General Administration     5.12     1.06          4.68      0.87 
Supervision       4.98     1.23          4.92      1.32 
Coordination       5.39     1.00          4.85
 
     0.90 
Behavior Flexibility      5.25     1.17          4.83      1.08 
Fact Finding       5.38     1.11          4.88
 
     1.06 
Problem Solving      5.18     1.03          4.86      1.10 
Resistance to Stress      5.22     1.11          5.25      0.97 
Ability to Learn and Develop     5.71     1.01          5.41      1.20 
Tolerance of Ambiguity     5.08     1.13          4.81      0.86 
Management Potential     6.02     1.93          6.65      2.08 
Overall Job Performance     5.35     1.06          5.11      1.08 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BSAT score              218.62   13.89      209.78
  
   15.49 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Note:  Adapted from Tables 14 and 17 of the original validation 
                                 report.
4
   Scores on the 7-point  rating scales have been reversed 
                                 so that high scores reflect better ratings.  Means indicated in red 
                                                 
differ from the mean for whites with  p<0.05 by Tukey's Honest  
                                 Significant  Difference  multiple  range test.   These statistically 
                                 significant group differences were found when following up sig- 
                                 nificant F-values from initial one-way analyses of variance with 
                                 white, Latino, and African-American groups. 
 
 
 In the Melendez case, we took the “mid-
dle-ground” approach of adjusting the criterion 
to p<0.05 in the validation studies.  This reduces 
spurious effects (Type I errors), without unduly 
increasing false no-difference conclusions (Type 
II errors) due to low statistical power.  Evalua-
ted at this criterion, there are no significant val-
idity coefficients in the Followup Study. 
 Illinois Bell defended its inflationary sta-
tistical procedures with a statement in the Uni-
form Guidelines that one should usually use the 
p<0.05 level in establishing statistical signifi-
cance: “...Generally, a selection procedure is 
considered related to the criterion, for the pur-
poses of these guidelines, when the relationship 
between performance on the procedure and per-
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formance on the criterion measure is statisti-
cally significant at the p<0.05 level of signifi-
cance” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(5)).  
The Uniform Guidelines nonetheless require the 
use of “professionally acceptable statistical pro-
cedures” in computing validity coefficients 
(Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(5)), and also 
caution users to avoid using procedures that 
capitalize on chance: “Overstatement of validity 
findings.  Users should avoid reliance upon 
techniques which tend to overestimate validity 
findings as a result of capitalization on chance 
unless an appropriate safeguard is taken.  Reli-
ance upon a few selection procedures or criteria 
of successful job performance when many selec-
tion procedures or criteria of performance have 
been studied, or the use of optimal statistical 
weights for selection procedures computed in 
one sample, are techniques which tend to inflate 
validity estimates as a result of chance.  Use of a 
large sample is one safeguard; cross-validation 
another.” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B.(7). 
 Clearly, performing 1100 statistical tests 
at the p<0.05 level is a procedure that capitali-
zes on chance.  Under the Guidelines, an adjust-
ment to the alpha-level is in order, minimally 
one such as using p<0.01.  To reduce jury con-
fusion over these technical issues, the Uniform 
Guidelines should include specific recommend-
dations (e.g., Bonferroni adjustments) for reduc-
ing Type I error when a large number of statisti-
cal tests have been conducted. 
Filling the Validity Gap with Junk Science: 
Reinventing Statistics 
 Through the above evidence, plaintiff 
demonstrated that the BSAT had, at most, 
negligible validity for white applicants, and no 
validity for Latino applicants.  And how did 
Illinois Bell respond to plaintiff’s showing?  
Illinois Bell’s expert witness, an organizational 
psychologist, asserted that if the BSAT truly had 
a nonsignificant (i.e., zero) statistical relation-
ship with job performance for Latinos, then half 
of the validity coefficients for Latinos should 
have been positive, and half negative.  In other 
words, if the true value of the correlation in the 
population is zero, then there should be just as 
many positive validity coefficients as negative.  
He noted, however, that 14 of the 15 coeffi-
cients for Latinos in the Followup Study were 
positive (if not statistically significant).  He then 
calculated the binomial probability of obtaining 
14 positive coefficients and 1 negative, given a 
0.50 probability for obtaining either sign (i.e., 
z=3.30, p<0.0005).  From this scenario, he 
deduced that, despite the complete lack of any 
correlation in the AT&T validation study, the 
BSAT was nonetheless valid for Latinos—and 
at a highly significant p-value! 
 By pitting one expert’s statistical anal-
ysis against the other’s, this form of “junk 
science” has great potential to confuse the jury.  
To clarify the issue for the layperson, what is 
needed is a logical, easy-to-follow explanation 
of the difference between the two opposing 
views of the same data.  However, this is not 
always easily developed. 
 In the Melendez case, we explained the 
statistical issue in commonsense terms by using 
an archery analogy.  Testing the validity of the 
BSAT is like an archery contest.  An archer fires 
15 arrows at a target; to determine his profi-
ciency, we count how many arrows hit the tar-
get.  Using the BSAT to predict the 15 perform-
ance criteria for Latinos, we count how many 
times it shows a statistically significant relation-
ship between test score and job performance.  
Table 3 shows that for Latinos, all 15 arrows 
missed the mark.  By the rules of the game, the 
archer does not score, and the BSAT is off tar-
get (and invalid). 
 By Illinois Bell’s logic, however, 14 of 
the 15 arrows flew in the target’s general direc-
tion (i.e., 14 of the 15 validity coefficients were 
positive) and only 1 arrow flew in the opposite 
direction (i.e., there was only one negative vali-
dity coefficient), and so therefore the archer was 
a success (and the BSAT is valid for Latinos 
because only one of its validity coefficients was 
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negative).  This is fallacious.  At issue is the 
magnitude of the validity coefficients in the pos-
itive direction, not just whether the signs of 
these coefficients are positive or negative.  For 
the BSAT, the magnitudes were insufficient to 
establish a statistically significant relationship.  
As the Seventh Circuit ruled on appeal, there 
was “strong evidence of the BSAT’s inability to 
predict job performance,” which supported the 
trial court’s finding that “the BSAT’s discrimi-
natory impact was unjustified by Illinois Bell’s 
legitimate business needs” (79 F.3d at 669).  
That is, the BSAT explains too little variance in 
performance ratings to be considered valid for 
use in hiring Latinos.  If the BSAT does not pro-
vide useful, job-related information, then its use 
cannot be justified, given the strong evidence of 
its adverse impact. 
 The Admissibility of “Junk Science” 
in the Courtroom 
 Illinois Bell’s spurious defense, that its 
test is “valid” because of its positive (though not 
statistically significant) correlations with perfor-
mance ratings, exemplifies the dangers of “junk 
science” in the courtroom.  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has cautioned: “Expert evidence can be 
both powerful and quite misleading because of 
the difficulty in evaluating it.” (Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 595 (quoting Weinstein, 1992)).  Due to 
defendant’s discovery abuse, Melendez was able 
to bar, altogether, the testimony of the com-
pany’s expert witness.  More typically, dubious 
science is precluded through a ruling by the trial 
court that the information is inadmissible under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 Expert testimony is specifically govern-
ed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which es-
tablishes ground rules for admitting expert 
testimony: “If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know-
ledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise” (Fed. R. Evid. 702).  As interpreted 
in the landmark Daubert decision, Rule 702 
allows expert testimony when it is both relevant 
and scientifically reliable.  In Daubert the Court 
appointed the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” of 
expert testimony, asserting: “[t]his entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reason-
ing or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reason-
ing or methodology properly can be applied to 
the facts in issue.” (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-
593).  The Court went on to explain: “The inqu-
iry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a 
flexible one.  Its overarching subject is the sci-
entific validity—and thus the evidentiary releva-
nce and reliability—of the principles that under-
lie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, 
must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on the conclusions that they generate”  
(Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-595). 
 More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held unanimously that a trial court’s decision to 
admit or exclude expert evidence should be 
accorded great deference (Joiner, 118 S.Ct. 
512).  Noting that trial judges typically are not 
scientists, Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Breyer encouraged judges to take the initiative 
to clarify scientific issues (Joiner, 118 S.Ct. 
512, 520-521 (Breyer, J., concurring)).  They 
may, for example, utilize their authority to ap-
point their own experts, or use pretrial hearings 
to explore the issues.   The Daubert Court ex-
plains that the goal is a middle ground, between 
“a ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries are 
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudo-
scientific assertions”, and “a stifling and repre-
ssive scientific orthodoxy” (Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 595-596).  The Court recalled the differences 
between scientific inquiry and the law, emphasi-
zing that Federal Rules of Evidence are “design-
ed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic un-
derstanding but for the particularized resolution 
of legal disputes” (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). 
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The Concept of Test “Fairness” 
 Besides adverse impact and validity, an-
other critical concept in judging whether or not 
a test in discriminatory is test “fairness.” 
Although researchers have suggested numerous 
definitional frameworks and statistical models 
of test fairness
7-12
, two approaches are often 
used in litigation to define “unfairness,” and to 
determine whether a test is “unfair.” 
 Anne Cleary
13
 pioneered one of these 
definitions at the Educational Testing Service.  
According to Cleary’s model, a test is consid-
ered “unfair” when it predicts performance dif-
ferently for different ethnic groups.  This differ-
ential prediction is detected in the form of statis-
tically significant differences between groups in 
the slopes and in the intercepts of the regression 
lines relating test scores to performance.  Thus, 
a test is considered “fair” when there are no sig-
nificant differences in errors of prediction be-
tween groups, using a common regression line.  
Ironically, by a strict application of Cleary’s 
definition, an invalid test could be deemed 
“fair.”  It would not be unfair, for example, to 
use a coin-flip to hire job applicants, because 
this selection procedure does not predict perfor-
mance better for one ethnic group than for an-
other.  It is equally invalid for both groups. 
 Another definition of “unfairness” pro-
minent in the courts is that used in the Uniform 
Guidelines, under which a test is “unfair” when: 
“...members of one race, sex, or ethnic group 
characteristically obtain lower scores on a selec-
tion procedure than members of another group, 
and the differences in scores are not reflected in 
differences in a measure of job performance...” 
(Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(8)(a)). 
 In practice, one determines whether a 
test is “unfair” by comparing group means on 
the test, then looking for comparable mean-dif-
ferences in group performance ratings.  If one 
group scores higher on the test, it must also do 
better on the job.  Stated differently, a test is 
“unfair” if it denies job opportunities to a group 
whose actual job performance is up to par. 
 Applying the Uniform Guidelines’ defin-
ition of “unfairness” to the BSAT Followup 
Study, Latinos had significantly lower BSAT 
scores than whites, and passed the test at a signi-
ficantly lower rate (77% vs. 47% in 1979; 87% 
vs. 53% in 1987-88; Table 1).  In contrast, on 12 
of the 15 performance criteria, Latino and white 
performance ratings did not differ significantly 
(Table 4).  In other words, 80% of the perfor-
mance measures (including overall job perfor-
mance) failed to show lower scores for Latinos 
than whites.  Considered together, this evidence 
shows that the BSAT is “unfair” to Latinos 
within the meaning of the Uniform Guidelines. 
Twisting the Uniform Guidelines 
to Establish Test “Fairness” 
 In a spurious defense of the BSAT, Illi-
nois Bell purported to rely on the Uniform 
Guidelines’ definition of test unfairness.  At trial 
the defense argued that the company adhered to 
the letter of the Uniform Guidelines, and advan-
ced two lines of defense based on the Guide-
lines.  Neither the law nor professional stand-
ards support these arguments. 
 What constitutes “a measure of job per-
formance”?  On cross-examination, the defense 
read to the jury the Uniform Guidelines’ defini-
tion of test unfairness in Section 14.B(8)(a), and 
then asked: 
Q: “Am I correct, Doctor, that this says that 
the differences in scores are not reflected 
in differences in a measure of job 
performance?  Do you see that, Doctor?” 
A: “Yes, I do.” 
Q: “And you have just testified that here 
there are three measures of job 
performance at which Whites score 
statistically higher than Hispanics, is that 
correct Doctor?” 
A: “That’s correct.” 
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Q: “So according to this definition which 
you have been relying on, there is not 
unfairness in this test, isn’t that right, 
Doctor?” 
 The trial court struck this line of ques-
tioning.  Illinois Bell’s interpretation of the Uni-
form Guidelines’ definition of “test unfairness” 
lacks any scientific or legal basis.  While the 
term “measure” may signify either a single item, 
or a set of items measuring a single latent con-
struct, this is no mere semantic quibble.  What 
constitutes a “measure,” in a given context, 
must be determined through appropriate legal 
and statistical analysis. 
 As a legal matter, Illinois Bell’s interpre-
tation of Section 14.B(8)(a) ignores its precise 
language.  Through the use of the phrase “dif-
ferences in a measure,” the Uniform Guidelines 
plainly contemplate “a measure” as comprising 
more than one item.  This conclusion is reinfor-
ced by the language of the definition of “unfair-
ness” in the “Definitions” section of the Uni-
form Guidelines: “Unfairness of selection pro-
cedure.  A condition in which members of one 
race, sex, or ethnic group characteristically ob-
tain lower scores on a selection procedure than 
members of another group, and the differences 
are not reflected in differences in measures of 
job performance.  See section 14.B.(7)” (Uni-
form Guidelines, §1607.16.V) [emphasis add-
ed].  The two definitions of “unfairness” must 
be read together, and thus do not support reli-
ance on an isolated difference in measurement 
(“Definitions” section of the Uniform Guide-
lines mandates “[t]he following definitions shall 
apply throughout these guidelines” (Uniform 
Guidelines, §1607.16) [emphasis added]). 
 Illinois Bell’s argument, moreover, 
would permit an employer to ignore the vast 
weight of unfavorable evidence, so long as any 
favorable evidence existed at all.  Defendant’s 
interpretation would render the unfairness stand-
ard meaningless.  The term “measure” cannot be 
applied arbitrarily, but requires a fact-sensitive 
analysis. 
 In the Melendez case, we reanalyzed the 
correlations among the 15 performance ratings 
using both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis.
14
  We found that the 15 criteria are 
most accurately represented as a single, global 
measure of job performance.  Statistically, the 
15 ratings are sufficiently interrelated so that 
they comprise not 15 independent measures, but 
rather only one underlying measure.  The separ-
ate performance ratings cannot properly be con-
sidered individually. 
 Factor analysis should be used routinely 
in deciding whether to employ single items or 
composite scales to measure job performance.  
This would preclude test developers from treat-
ing sets of unidimensional criterion measures as 
multiple single-item indicators, and then select-
ing and highlighting, as evidence of test “fair-
ness,” any criteria on which the majority group 
has a higher mean.  Confirmatory factor analy-
sis, not subjective preference, should answer the 
question: “what is a measure?” 
 Factor analytic methodology adheres to 
the Uniform Guidelines, which proscribe “...rel-
iance upon techniques which tend to overesti-
mate validity findings as a result of capitaliza-
tion on chance....  Reliance upon a few... criteria 
of successful job performance when many... 
criteria of performance have been studied... 
tend[s] to inflate validity estimates as a result of 
chance.” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(7)). 
 By what criterion should one judge dif-
ferences in group means?  On cross-examina-
tion, the defense inquired where the unfairness 
standard in the Uniform Guidelines requires that 
group differences be statistically significant.  
The Uniform Guidelines do not authorize excur-
sions into chance associations, but the unfair-
ness standard does not explicitly require statis-
tical significance as a decision criterion.  It 
should be noted, however, that the “Documenta-
tion” requirements of the Uniform Guidelines 
mandate the reporting of methods of data analy-
sis, as well as the magnitude, direction, and sta-
tistical significance of results.  It expressly re-
Optimal Data Analysis     Copyright 2010 by Optimal Data Analysis, LLC 
2010, Vol. 1, Release 1 (September 17, 2010)   2155-0182/10/$3.00 
 
 
 
188 
 
quires that “[s]tatements regarding the statistical 
significance of results should be made (essen-
tial).” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.15.B(8)).  
This section of the Guidelines specifically refers 
to measures of central tendency (e.g., means) 
and studies of test fairness.  Illinois Bell argued, 
in essence, that professional statistical standards 
may somehow be suspended in evaluating em-
ployment test data. 
 Abandoning professional standards is 
scientifically and legally untenable.  The Uni-
form Guidelines are themselves founded on the 
standards of the psychological profession.
 
 The 
Uniform Guidelines, §1607.1.C, states: “These 
guidelines have been built upon court decisions, 
the previously issued guidelines of the agencies, 
and the practical experience of the agencies, as 
well as the standards of the psychological pro-
fession.” 
 Test developers should always adhere to 
professional standards for drawing inferences 
from data.  The Guidelines do not require re-
searchers to clear the memory of their calculator 
between computations, but researchers typically 
do so as a matter of course.  Nor can employers 
ignore the Guidelines’ prohibition against reli-
ance on chance (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14. 
B(7)).  And yet, that is precisely the result if one 
relies on apparent group differences that lack 
statistical significance. 
Illusory “Fairness” and 
Artifactual “Validity” 
 Under the Uniform Guidelines’ “unfair-
ness” standard, if one ethnic group scores higher 
than another on an employment test, and this 
difference is not reflected in a measure of job 
performance, the test is deemed “unfair.”  The 
BSAT failed this standard.  Despite great dispar-
ities in test scores, whites and Latinos perform-
ed on the job with substantially similar success. 
 Importantly, under the Uniform Guide-
lines, the mere fact that majorities outscore mi-
norities on an examination, while securing more 
favorable performance evaluations, does not 
affirmatively establish that the test is “fair.”  It 
does not prove the positive, that the test is “fair” 
and “job related,” but it does disprove one pos-
sible negative.  The standard, that is, should not 
be understood as establishing an affirmative de-
fense for employers.  Evidence that a test is not 
“unfair” merely forestalls the inference of dis-
crimination that arises in cases when the group 
that excels on the test, garnering the greater 
share of job opportunities, does not actually do 
the job appreciably better.  To prove or disprove 
“fairness,” the parties may introduce other 
evidence. 
 Ironically, the pattern of data contem-
plated by the Uniform Guidelines’ unfairness 
standard may result in a serious distortion of the 
validity evidence.  If the data from different eth-
nic groups are simply (and improperly) combin-
ed in a pooled analysis, the distribution of the 
data will typically create the illusion of a corre-
lation between test scores and performance rat-
ings.  Scatterplotting the data, the group with 
higher test scores and performance ratings will 
tend to fall in the upper right quadrant of the 
scatterplot.  The group with lower test scores 
and performance ratings will tend to fall in the 
lower left quadrant of the scatterplot.  This pat-
tern will create an apparent correlation between 
test scores and performance ratings, despite the 
lack of any true relationship, and it will inflate 
obtained validity coefficients for the total sam-
ple.  This problem is a variation of a phenom-
enon known as Simpson’s paradox.
15,16
 
 The following hypothetical example 
demonstrates how the “false correlation” para-
dox can occur.  Imagine that you are in the mid-
dle of a job interview.  The interview is going 
well, so you broach the topic of salary.  “How 
much would I be paid?”  “Well,” replies the in-
terviewer, “take off your shoes, and let’s find 
out.”  Requesting an explanation, you are told 
that the company has found that shoe size is a 
valid predictor of a person’s worth.  The com-
pany routinely measures the size of job appli-
cants’ feet, and then uses the results of that 
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measurement to determine salary.  Still skepti-
cal, you ask to see the validity evidence, and the 
interviewer hands you a copy of a table from a 
research document (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5: Validating Shoe Size as a Predictor of Salary: Hypothetical Raw Data for Women and Men 
   Women  Occupation  Shoe Size  Annual Salary 
--------------  --------------  ------------  ----------------- 
Ann   secretary        3      $ 22,000 
Beatrice  actress         4      $ 14,000 
Carol   teacher         4      $ 30,000 
Diane   librarian        5      $ 20,000 
Edna   lab technician        5      $ 40,000 
Florence  baby sitter        5      $ 10,000 
Gwen   journalist        6      $ 28,000 
Harriet   bank teller        6      $ 18,000 
Iris   nurse         7      $ 32,000 
Jacqueline  waitress        7      $ 16,000 
                                    Mean :        5.2      $ 23,000 
 
    Men   Occupation  Shoe Size  Annual Salary 
-------------  --------------  ------------  ----------------- 
Al   salesman        8      $ 48,000 
Bob   airline pilot        8      $ 62,000 
Carl   chef         9      $ 50,000 
Don   chemist       10      $ 55,000 
Ed   executive       10      $ 70,000 
Frank   mechanic       10      $ 40,000 
Greg   plumber       11      $ 52,000 
Harold   electrician       11      $ 59,000 
Ian   detective       12      $ 45,000 
John   architect       12      $ 65,000 
                                                         Mean                              10.1              $ 54,600 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   Exact Test of Gender Difference:            p<0.000001                   p<0.000547 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 This table presents raw (hypothetical) 
data for a sample of 10 men and 10 women, list-
ing their first name, occupation, shoe size, and 
salary.  Reported at the bottom of the data table 
are the results of exact nonparametric statistical 
analyses
5
 comparing men’s and women’s mean 
shoe-size (predictor) and salary (criterion).  Wo-
men have smaller feet than men, and have com-
parably smaller salaries.  Therefore, by the Uni-
form Guidelines’ unfairness standard, it is not 
“unfair” to men or to women to use shoe size to 
determine salary. Validity coefficients relating 
shoe size to salary, and scatterplots of shoe size 
and salary, are presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Correlating Shoe Size and Salary using Pooled Hypothetical Raw Data for Women and Men
 Examination of validity coefficients for 
men and women reveals there is no linear rela-
tionship between shoe size and salary for either 
group: r=0.05 for men, r=0.07 for women, ps> 
0.05. But, if men’s and women’s raw data are 
pooled, the men’s data fall into the upper right-
hand quadrant of the scatterplot, and the 
women’s data fall into the lower left-hand quad-
rant (men score higher than women on predictor 
and criterion measures).  When the correlation 
between shoe size and salary is computed for 
the total group of 20 subjects, r=0.78, p<0.001)!  
Based on this evidence and in accordance with 
the Uniform Guidelines, it is concluded that it is 
both fair and valid to use shoe size to determine 
salary.
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 This hypothetical scenario is no more 
absurd than the BSAT validation work.  In the 
Preliminary Study, for example, African-Amer-
icans had lower BSAT scores than whites, and 
they also had comparably lower performance 
ratings (thus the test does not meet the definition 
of unfairness, under the Uniform Guidelines’ 
definition). 
 Figure 2 displays scatterplots of the 
group means on the BSAT and on overall job 
performance from the two validity studies.  
Clearly, these mean differences will inflate the 
apparent linearity of the relationship between 
BSAT and performance.   
 This inflation of correlations strikingly 
appears in the table of validity coefficients from 
the Preliminary Study (Table 2).  Comparing the 
correlations of white, African-American, and 
total groups on the various performance meas-
ures, we find an anomalous pattern. 
 Consider the performance criterion of 
Decision Making.  Its validity coefficient is 
r=0.20 for the group of 94 whites, and r=0.27 
for the group of 39 African-Americans.  For the 
Total Group, however, the r=0.30 correlation is 
higher than that for either subgroup.  Similarly, 
the validity coefficients for Written Communi-
cations are r=0.21 for whites, r=0.26 for Afri-
can-Americans, and r=0.28 for the Total Group; 
for Resistance to Stress, r=0.11 for whites, r= 
0.18 for African-Americans, and r=0.21 for the 
Total Group; and for Energy, r=0.04 for whites, 
r=0.08 for African-Americans, and r=0.15 for  
the total group.  Cases such as these, in which 
the correlations for the pooled group actually 
exceed the correlations found in each consti-
tuent subgroup, are a tell-tale sign of the “false 
correlation paradox,” where in fact the “whole” 
is deceptively greater than the sum (or weighted 
average) of its parts.
16
 
 This technical problem is particularly 
critical because Illinois Bell rested its claim that 
the test was valid largely based on one num-
ber—one validity coefficient: the correlation be-
tween BSAT score and the rating of overall job 
performance, for the Total Group in the Prelimi-
nary Study.  That coefficient is r=0.38, signifi-
cant for the total sample of 153 subjects at p< 
0.00001 (see Table 2). 
 A possible methodology for circumvent-
ing such paradoxical confounding (the technical 
terminology for the “false-correlation problem”) 
is to remove mean differences on the x- and y-
variables before combining the data: for exam-
ple, standardizing the x- and y-scores separately 
for each group using a z-score transformation 
maps the data into the same metric.
16
 How does 
this work in the shoe size example?  After trans-
forming subjects’ raw data to z-scores separately 
within the male and female samples, and sub-
jecting these standardized data to correlation 
analysis, yields results given in Figure 3.  When 
properly analyzed, the correlation between shoe-
size and salary is r=0.05 for men, r=0.07 for 
women, and r=0.06 for the total group. 
 This cure for Simpson’s paradox (norm-
atively standardizing separately by sample) only 
works if the true relationship between x and y is 
consistent across the multiple samples.
16
  For 
example, if x and y are perfectly positively corr-
elated in sample A and perfectly negatively 
correlated in sample B, normatively standard-
izing the data separately by sample and then 
combining them will yield a correlation coeffic-
ient of zero.  Thus, it is necessary to verify ho-
mogeneity of covariance between x and y across 
samples before standardizing and pooling the 
data.
16-18
 
 Fortunately, instances of reverse validity 
rarely appear in the personnel selection litera-
ture.
19
  Indeed, some proponents of validity gen-
eralization have even argued against the notion 
of differential validity altogether, though the 
BSAT data clearly show stronger evidence of 
validity for African-Americans than for Latinos 
or whites.
10
  Thus, when analyzing the total 
sample, it should be routine practice before 
pooling data to normatively standardize separa-
tely within groups (after first verifying between-
group equivalence of covariance matrices). 
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Figure 2: Scatterplotting BSAT score and overall job performance for the Preliminary and Followup 
Studies.   Supervisors rated overall performance using a  9-point Likert-type scale in the Preliminary 
Study (1,2=exceptionally high; 3,4=very high; 5,6=moderately high; 7,8=moderately low; 9=unsatis-
factory) and 7-point Likert-type scale in the Followup Study (1=exceptionable; 2=very high; 3=high;     
4=average; 5=below average; 6=passable; 7=unacceptable).   Scores on these rating scales have been 
reversed for ease of presentation.
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Figure 3: Correlating shoe size and salary using hypothetical data normatively standardized sep- 
arately for women and men  
 
 Yet, typically researchers simply pool 
data across subgroups in total-sample analyses.  
This practice inflates total sample validities 
throughout the testing industry.  Among the 
most robust findings in the literature on cogni-
tive ability testing is that minorities score signi- 
ficantly lower on cognitive ability tests than do 
whites.
20
   And in validation studies,  minorities  
 
often receive significantly lower performance 
ratings.
21
  Ironically, if test scores are lower for 
minorities than for whites, to meet the Uniform 
Guidelines’ unfairness standard, minority per-
formance ratings must also be lower.  Although 
it is not unfair within the meaning of the 
Uniform Guidelines, this very situation will 
typically make tests appear more valid than they 
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really are, if data are simplistically pooled and 
correlated.  Test developers should avoid indis-
criminately pooling subgroup data, particularly 
when these subgroups have different means on 
the test and on the criterion. 
 The Uniform Guidelines provide a basis 
for addressing the distortions arising from the 
improper pooling of data.  Section 1607.14.B 
(4), entitled “Representativeness of the sample,” 
relevantly provides: Where samples are combi-
ned or compared, attention should be given to 
see that such samples are comparable in terms 
of the actual job they perform, the length of time 
on the job where time on the job is likely to 
affect performance, and other relevant factors 
likely to affect validity differences; or that these 
factors are included in the design of the study 
and their effects identified (emphasis added). 
 Hardly restricted to industrial/organiza-
tional psychology, this false-correlation problem 
pervades the life sciences: indeed it has been 
stated that the problem of paradoxical confound-
ing is the most significant and pervasive chal-
lenge to the validity of empirical quantitative 
analysis in all areas of inquiry.
22
  The practice of 
simply pooling data across subgroups inflates 
correlation coefficients whenever one group has 
higher mean scores than the other on both x and 
y.  For example, studies of naturalistic animal 
behavior often pool data across intact groups to 
examine relationships among social and behav-
ioral variables, without regard to possible mean 
differences.
23
  Similarly, personality psycholo-
gists often pool the data of males and females, 
examine the correlations among numerous 
measures of, for example, anxiety, neuroticism, 
and general maladjustment, and find a single, 
stable pervasive trait that they label negative 
affectivity.
24
  Given that women tend to report 
higher levels of negative experience in general 
than do men
25
, pooling male and female data 
without standardization will inflate the observed 
intercorrelations for the total group, exaggerate-
ing structural unidimensionality. 
 The problem of when and how to com-
bine the data of multiple groups remains largely 
ignored in the social sciences.
16
  Haphazardly 
pooling data across different groups (or time 
periods
16
) can produce unexpected, counterintu-
itive relationships, which researchers inevitably 
scramble to explain a posteriori.  If one group 
scores lower than the other on x but higher on y, 
for example, then simply pooling the data across 
groups can produce a negative correlation for 
the total sample, even if the x-y relationship is 
actually positive in each group (the group with 
lower x scores and higher y scores will fall in 
the upper-left quadrant of the scatterplot, where-
as the group with higher x scores and lower y 
scores will fall in the lower-right quadrant, 
yielding a false negative correlation).  As a case 
in point, when studying psychosocial adjustment 
to head injury, researchers often combine the 
data of patients who are aware of functional def-
icits with the data of patients who are unaware 
of functional deficits.  The correlation between 
severity of injury and emotional distress is then 
computed.  An unexpected negative correlation 
often emerges, with greater severity of injury 
predictive of less distress.
26-28
  It seems likely 
that the correlation between severity of injury 
and distress is actually positive within both the 
deficit-aware and deficit-unaware groups (i.e., 
greater severity linked to greater emotional dis-
tress), but that patients aware of their impair-
ment have less severe head trauma (lower x-
scores) and report higher levels of emotional 
distress (higher y-scores) than do patients who 
are unaware of their impairment, creating a false 
negative correlation for the pooled sample. 
 At first blush, the procedure of standard-
izing data separately within groups before com-
puting pooled validity coefficients may seem 
similar to so-called race norming.
29
  This latter 
practice seeks to ameliorate a test’s adverse im-
pact in personnel selection, by expressing indiv-
idual test scores in terms of their standing rela-
tive to the mean of their particular racial group.  
However, the two approaches have entirely 
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different objectives.  Race-norming uses stand-
ardization in deciding which job applicants to 
hire.  Standardizing raw data separately within 
groups before computing pooled validity coeffi-
cients, on the other hand, is done simply to 
avoid bias in estimating test validity, and is not 
used to select job applicants.  Whereas race 
norming disaggregates data to avoid comparison 
between groups when selecting applicants, 
standardizing before computing pooled validity 
coefficients allows data from different groups to 
be meaningfully aggregated when evaluating 
test validity if their covariance is homogeneous. 
Implications for Validity Generalization 
 Besides highlighting ambiguities in the 
Uniform Guidelines, the Melendez case also has 
implications for meta-analytic research on vali-
dity generalization.
10
  This area of research en-
tails synthesizing validity coefficients from 
studies attempting to validate personnel selec-
tion tests, in order to draw conclusions about the 
relationship between cognitive ability and job 
performance.  Typically, these meta-analyses 
have concluded that cognitive ability tests are 
generally valid in the workplace across a full 
range of different racial subgroups, different 
jobs, different tests, and different settings.
10
  
Although conclusions about validity generaliza-
tion have been criticized on a variety of statis-
tical and conceptual grounds
30
, the problem of 
paradoxical counfounding has been overlooked. 
 Validity coefficients based on pooled 
unstandardized data will be biased whenever the 
data contain subsamples that reliably differ on 
both the predictor and the criterion (e.g., racial 
subgroups, gender, types of jobs, different sites 
of data collection).  Synthesizing validity coeffi-
cients will yield biased conclusions when the 
coefficients share a common bias (e.g., whites 
had higher test scores and higher performance 
ratings than other racial subgroups, and the data 
of racial subgroups were simply combined).  
This suggests that previous meta-analyses of test 
validation studies using total sample correla-
tions have overestimated overall effect strength. 
 Although most statistical adjustments in 
meta-analysis serve to increase the strength of 
observed relationships by correcting for sources 
of unreliability
10
, a comparable adjustment is 
needed to remove the inflation in correlations 
due to paradoxical confounding.  If means and 
standard deviations are available for racial sub-
groups from the primary studies, for example, 
then group differences can be examined on the 
predictor (x) and the criterion (y).  When one 
group scores higher than others on x or y, a bet-
ter estimate of the pooled correlation coefficient 
is a weighted composite of the correlations for 
the separate subgroups, using r-to-z method-
ology.
18
  Paradoxical confounding exists when-
ever the coefficient based on pooled data differs 
from the weighted mean coefficient across sub-
groups. 
 In the name of validity generalization, 
extravagant claims have been made for the effi-
cacy of cognitive ability tests as personnel sel-
ection devices.  For example, it has been argued: 
“[R]eliable measures of the standard aptitudes 
(e.g., verbal, quantitative, and spatial abilities) 
are valid predictors of... performance on the job 
for all jobs in the occupational spectrum... 
[T]hese findings can be generalized to all jobs in 
the economy for which tests are used in selec-
tion... [T]here are no jobs or job families for 
which reliable measures of cognitive ability do 
not have validity”.
31
  Couching claims in cosmic 
hyperbole, validity generalization is likened to 
“the powerful telescopes used in astronomy,” 
and it is suggested that the theory is as well-
established as the measurement of the speed of 
light.
31
 
 Ironically, persistent disparities between 
test scores and performance evaluations of maj-
ority and minority employees is also what one 
would expect from a pervasive pattern of dis-
crimination.  Consistent use of discriminatory 
employment tests, coupled with racially-biased 
supervisory evaluations, would produce com-
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parable statistical outcomes.  For this result to 
obtain, overt and conscious racial discrimination 
need not exist.  For example, unconscious, sub-
jective perceptions favoring majority employees 
would tend to inflate the mean criterion measure 
for this subgroup; similarly, the impact of broad 
societal discrimination would tend to depress 
the mean test performance of a minority group.  
Where the data for such racial and ethnic groups 
are pooled without correcting for differences in 
means on predictor and criterion, the likely 
result is a distribution yielding false positive 
correlations.  The resulting evidence of “valid-
ity” would be illusory. 
 The implications for the theory of 
validity generalization are clear.  Meta-analysis 
is based in a vast pool of results from combined 
samples, drawn primarily from reported validity 
studies of employment tests.  A systematic bias 
throughout this data base would correspond-
ingly bias the meta-analysis.  Further empirical 
research is needed to isolate and assess the sta-
tistical impact of artifactual validity arising from 
paradoxical confounding. 
Conclusion 
 The case of Melendez v. Illinois Bell 
Telephone Company highlights ambiguities in 
the Uniform Guidelines for validating personnel 
selection tests.  Although the Guidelines could 
be revised to clarify these ambiguities, there is a 
potential drawback to this approach: namely, the 
possibility that hard-won legal precedents, 
gained over the years in the courts, might be lost 
if the Guidelines were substantially modified.
30
  
There is an inevitable trade-off here between 
more specificity in the Uniform Guidelines, and 
less applicability of previous court rulings. 
 Although the judgment in the Melendez 
case strengthens the legal means for removing 
invalid, discriminatory tests from the workplace, 
it does not immediately reduce the likelihood of 
such tests being developed in the first place, as 
might revisions in the Uniform Guidelines.  
Ultimately, however, the demise of invalid dis-
criminatory tests in the workplace may depend 
more on their perceived liability costs for the 
user than on the specificity of the guidelines for 
test development. 
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